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The United States forward military presence in the 
Middle East has been on the rise for well over a decade.  
Recent polling data has indicated that favorable Arab 
public opinion of the United States and its foreign policy 
is in decline.  This thesis explores the unfavorable 
opinions of the Arab world toward U.S. foreign policies, 
utilizing data from recent polls taken in several countries 
in the Middle East, and suggests a causal relationship 
between the development of unfavorable opinion in the Arab 
world with the growth of the U.S. forward military presence 
in the region.  This research provides a breakdown of the 
growth of the U.S. military footprint in the Middle East 
over the last two decades.  The research presented provides 
an overview of how U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle 
East has developed and argues the necessity of reform in 
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CHAPTER I.  THESIS DEVELOPMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
At the end of the Gulf War, the United States employed 
a military security strategy in the Middle East that was 
designed to preserve regional stability, deter potential 
aggressors, and protect the United States strategic 
interests in the region.  There are four main elements to 
this posture: ensuring access to host nation facilities for 
ongoing operations and contingencies through bilateral 
agreements; prepositioning military equipment; building 
host nation self-defense capabilities through foreign 
military sales, training and joint exercises; and providing 
a continuously deployed forward U.S. military presence in 
the region.1   
In broader terms, the strategy employed by the United 
States for Middle Eastern security is one of engagement, 
forward presence, and rapid response.  This strategy has 
had varying success in the previous ten years for providing 
regional peace and a semblance of security in the Middle 
East.  Bilateral relationships have been established which 
have complemented the establishment of a physical 
infrastructure that allows for rapid U.S. response on short 
notice.  Also, an ongoing investment in the security 
posture of countries in the region to enable their own 
self-defense has tangentially contributed to a growing 
capability for regional defense.2 
The United States has had various policies in regards 
to its national interests in the Persian Gulf.  Many of 
                                                 
1
 Cordesman, Anthony. “The Gulf and Transition: U.S. Policy Ten Years 
after the Gulf War,” CSIS Middle East Studies Program, October, 2000. 
2
 United States Security Strategy for the Middle East, Department of 






these policies have had an impact on not only how Americans 
perceive the Persian Gulf, but also how the populations in 
the Persian Gulf and the other members of the international 
community see Americans.  In particular, the United States’ 
Post Gulf War security posture has been questioned and 
attacked.  Previous events have left their impact and 
resulted in an evolution of U.S. policy since the early 
1970’s.  Is the Post Gulf War U.S. security architecture 
relevant in today’s world?  Will it continue to protect 
U.S. interests?  Should our response to regional threats 
remain the same, or be altered? 
Overseas presence is the set of U.S. military 
assets and activities abroad that, as a 
complement to power projection from CONUS engages 
in purposeful security commitments and management 
efforts on behalf of a broad spectrum of national 
objectives that are “strategic” – that is, 
political, economic, and military in nature.3 
 
The United States military’s physical presence in the 
Middle East is a leading cause of popular disaffection 
among Arab nationals.  This fervor, partially caused by 
this dissent, helped create an environment where Islamic 
fundamentalism flourished and grew.  It also was a factor 
in the September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Center 
and the Pentagon, as well as numerous previous attacks on 
various U.S. targets around the world.  Recent polling data 
shows an intensifying disapproval in Arab attitudes toward 
the United States and U.S. foreign policy.  In fact, a 
majority of Arabs continue to doubt even the possibility of 
                                                 
3
 Kugler, Richard L.  Changes Ahead: Future Directions for the U.S. 





Arab involvement in the aforementioned attack.4  Would a 
reduction in the current U.S. security posture of physical 
presence in the Middle East designed to bolster foreign 
public opinion continue to protect U.S. national interests 
in the region?  This thesis argues that a reduction of the 
U.S. military footprint would not only contribute to a 
potential increase of foreign popular support, but would 
continue to protect U.S. interests in the region now and in 
the future. 
This thesis will cover the evolution of U.S. policy 
and specific events from 1970 to the present day.  It will 
evaluate the viability of the current policy employed in 
relation to specific regional threats.  It will also probe 
changes in Persian Gulf regional security, future oil 
capacity and demand, and international relations and 
reactions to U.S. presence and policy.   
 United States national security strategy seeks to 
maintain international allies in the Middle East.  In the 
Gulf, allies in various countries allow the United States 
to stage logistical gear and equipment, while others also 
allow a physical presence of United States military 
personnel and a utilization of their bases for American 
military operations.  These relationships, along with U.S. 
Naval presence in the region, allow the United States a 
significant forward deployed force capable of immediate 
response to security threats within the region.  A n 
erosion of any of these relationships could prove 
detrimental to U.S. policy implementation in the region.  
                                                 
4
 Stone, Andrea, Feb 27, 2002, Many in Islamic World doubt Arabs behind 







In an atmosphere of anti-U.S. sentiments, some U.S. allies 
may be politically unable to sustain their support for 
continued U.S. presence in the region. 
 The United States also has a significant interest in 
the oil production countries of the Middle East.  Between 
now and the year 2020, the global economy will need a 
significant increase in the oil production capacity in the 
Middle East.  The United States has a significant interest 
in maintaining access to this energy supply in order to 
support the increased energy consumption of the nation and 
the world.  The world’s growing demand for Gulf oil makes 
fiscal stability and reform of the oil producing nations, 
particularly Saudi Arabia, extremely important.  A solid 
fiscal grounding is essential to keep oil markets 
competitive and not artificially high.5 
B. POLLING DATA 
There have been several recent polls taken in regards 
to Arab and Muslim public opinion toward the United States 
and American foreign policy.  These polls are interested in 
explaining the reasons why there are negative and even 
hostile attitudes toward the United States.  This thesis 
will utilize data taken by polls conducted by Gallup and by 
Zogby International.  This thesis hypothesizes that the 
United States military’s physical presence in the Middle 
East is a leading cause of dissent among Arab nationals.  
The September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center 
and the pentagon, justify attempts to understand the 
growing divide between the United States and the Arab 
                                                 
5
 Energy Information Administration/International Energy Outlook 2001: 
World Energy Consumption; World Oil Markets; Energy Information 
Administration, OPEC Revenues Fact Sheet; and OPEC Revenues: Country 
Details, March 2001; Energy Information Administration, Persian Gulf 





world.  The regions response to the September 11, 2001, 
attacks are reveling.  A surprising response was given by 
the overwhelming majority of American Muslims, seventy-nine 
percent of whom believe that U.S. policy toward the Middle 
East led to the September 11, 2001, attack on the United 
States, according to a new poll that was conducted by Zogby 
International and financed by the Pew Charitable Trusts.  
Sixty-seven percent say that the best way to prevent 
further unconventional aggressive action is to change U.S. 
policy in the Middle East.6  
Recent polls demonstrate the negative Arab views of 
the United States foreign policy.  In fact, a majority of 
Arabs continue to doubt even the possibility of Arab 
involvement in the aforementioned attack.7 Zogby 
International conducted an intensive research project 
called “The Ten Nation Impressions of America Poll.”8  Some 
of their findings are quite eye-opening: 
• Incredibly low marks are given everywhere for United 
States policy toward the Arab nations and toward the 
Palestinians. The United States is only given single-
digit favorable ratings on its dealings with the Arab 
nations by every Arab nation (except UAE where it is 
15%, driven mostly by the large numbers of non-U.A.E. 
citizens included in the poll). In all countries, more 
than nine out of ten are unfavorable.  
 
• On U.S. policy toward the Palestinians, the numbers 
are even lower. Notably, the negative ratings are at 
least nine out of ten in every Arab nation.  
 
• In every country, the "Palestinian issue" is viewed as 
"the most" or "a very important" issue facing the Arab 
                                                 
6
 Paulson, Michael. Dec 29, 2001.  Survey: U.S. Muslims fault MidEast 




 The Ten Nation Impressions of America Poll report, Zogby 
International, April 11, 2002.  [Online]: http://www.zogby.com 





world today. The range on this is from two in three in 
Saudi Arabia up to four in five in Lebanon and Egypt.  
 
• Those polled in every country indicate that they would 
overwhelmingly react more favorably toward the U.S. if 
it "were to apply pressure to ensure the creation of 
an independent Palestinian state". This includes 69% 
in Egypt, 79% in Saudi Arabia, 87% in Kuwait (91% of 
Kuwaiti nationals), 59% in Lebanon, and 67% in UAE 
(76% of Emirates).9 
 
Would a reduction in the current U.S. security posture 
of physical presence in the Middle East designed to bolster 
foreign public opinion continue to protect U.S. national 
interests in the region?  This thesis argues that a 
reduction of the U.S. security footprint would not only 
contribute to a potential increase of foreign popular 
support, but would protect U.S. interests in the region now 
and in the future. 
C. HOW DID WE GET HERE? 
 Until the 1970’s, the United States had a hands off 
approach to security in the Persian Gulf region.  As 
British power in the region dwindled, the United States was 
left with very few options.  The Cold War mandated that the 
United States not allow the Soviet Union to become the 
preeminent power in the region.  When the British finally 
pulled out, the United States quickly stepped in to fill 
the void. 
 The “Twin Pillars” doctrine still allowed the United 
States to play a minimalists role.  Responsibility for the 
safety and security of the region was given to Iran and 
Saudi Arabia.  As both Saudi Arabia and Iran were major oil 
producers and the United States had relatively good 







relations with both countries, the national security 
interest of maintaining access to oil was relatively 
secure.  This worked relatively well until the Iranian 
Revolution, when the Shah fell from power.  Saudi Arabia 
was not in the position militarily to ensure the stability 
of the region.  Because of this, President Carter developed 
the Rapid Deployment Force for the Gulf.  President Reagan 
later created the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) further 
solidifying the United States willingness to protect the 
area from outside aggression by the Soviet Union, as well 
as project a forward presence to encourage stability in the 
region.10  
 The United States was slowly drawn into the Persian 
Gulf over several decades.  The United States initially, 
did not take the position as sole guarantor of Persian Gulf 
stability.  The United States did, however, commit to 
provide forces, training, and equipment to help Gulf 
nations.  Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait certainly exacerbated 
the United States response and further commitment to the 
region.  After Desert Storm, the United States has 
continually increased the level of U.S. military forces in 
the region, largely due to the continued enforcement of 
sanctions and no-fly zones against Iraq.   
The United States may have underestimated Saddam 
Hussein’s willingness to utilize the suffering of his own 
country’s population to keep them weak and ensure his 
continued rule.  His continued allowance of suffering has 
turned not only international attention against the United 
States sanctions on Iraq, but has also contributed to some 
                                                 
10
 Martin, Lenore G. “Patterns of Regional Conflict and U.S. Gulf 
Policy,” in U.S. Strategic Interests in the Gulf Region, W.J. Olson 





of the harsh resentment Arabs seem to be holding against 
the United States.11  
 The breakdown of the Middle East Peace Process is also 
a contributing factor to the rise of Arab resentment 
against the United States.  The United States strong 
support of Israel is also harshly regarded by Arabs.  Arabs 
see the United States holding a dual standard in the region 
in its stance toward Israel and Arab nations.   
The Palestinian struggle against Israel is not 
something that is new, but has been ongoing for quite some 
time.  The conflict essentially began while the British 
were influencing the politics of the area and began to call 
for the partition of Palestine into separate Jewish and 
Arab states.  The United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 181 reaffirmed the partition in 1947, and the 
state of Israel was born.12 
 There was an immediate negative reaction by the Arab 
states as they banded together and declared war on Israel.  
Israel defeated the Arab aggression and in the process, 
part of the area that was designated for the Palestinian 
state was conquered by Israel, and led to the displacement 
of some 750,000 Palestinians.13  Israel defeated Arab armies 
again in 1967 and acquired even more territory.14 
                                                 
11
 Graham-Brown, Sarah.  Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of 
Intervention in Iraq, St. Martin’s Press, 1999. 
12
 Schanzer, Jonathan. “Palestinian Uprisings Compared,” The Middle East 
Quarterly, Summer 2002, Volume IX, Number 3. [Online]: 
http://www.meforum.org/article/206/ [accessed October 16, 2002]. 
13
 Council on Foreign Relations. (2002). Flashpoint: Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Retrieved [October 16, 2002] from LexisNexis Database 
(Current Issues Universe, A153-16) on the World Wide Web: 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/ciuniv.  
14
 Middle East Research and Information Project. (2002). MERIP primer on 
the uprising in Palestine.  Retrieved [October 16, 2002] from 
LexisNexis Database (Current Issues Universe, R119-32) on the World 





 Israel now occupies the areas of Palestine considered 
to be the West Bank and the Gaza strip.  In conflict with 
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits 
an occupying state from transferring parts of its own 
civilian population into the territory it occupies, Israel 
has built numerous settlements in these regions further 
exacerbating the tensions and complicating the peace 
process. 
The Middle East Peace Process has been ongoing for 
some time, now with highlights being the Oslo Accords and 
the Camp David Summit.  However, each time the two groups 
come together, both sides point to the other with 
accusations of impropriety.  Israeli leaders say 
Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat broke a series of 1990s 
peace pacts, used violence as a political tool, and 
deliberately resorted to terrorism after spurning a 
generous Israeli proposal at Camp David, while Palestinian 
leaders say Israel never made a just peace offer and 
continues to besiege them, illegally occupy the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip, and confiscate Palestinian land for Jewish 
settlements.  
D. U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
The growing Arab outcry against the United States and 
the increasing impact of the attacks against American 
targets must be weighed carefully against the American 
ability to protect its national interests in the Middle 
East.  The National Security Strategy for a Global Age 
(NSS) describes the national interests of the United States 





East peace, maintaining worldwide access to oil, and 
ensuring the wellbeing and security of Israel.15   
Arab rulers are also very conscious of their 
legitimacy to rule and are becoming increasingly aware of 
their populations discontent.  To that end, Arab rulers 
must balance the extent to which they can cooperate with 
the United States as much of the U.S. stated policy is 
perceived as biased by their Arab populations, who “are far 
more critical, less understanding, and less forgiving of 
the U.S. pro-Israeli stance.”16  Negative Arab perceptions 
could possibly undermine the friendships and alliances that 
the United States currently has with Arab regimes.  If the 
United States wants to maintain its influence in the 
region, steps should immediately be taken to assuage the 
Arab populace’s negative opinions. 
E.  ORGANIZATION  
Chapter II will examine the evolution of the U.S. 
security policy in the Middle East.  It will look at some 
of the major events that altered this strategy prior to 
1990.  It will also describe some of the strategies the 
United States has utilized in the past as a basis for its 
policy such as deterrence, containment, and currently, 
preemption.  This chapter will lay the groundwork for the 
rest of the thesis as it describes the reasons employed in 
changing our security posture as well as the impact of our 
security posture on not only how Americans perceive the 
Persian Gulf, but also how the populations in the Persian 
                                                 
15
 The White House, A National Security Strategy For A Global Age, 
December 2000. 
16
 Hajjar, Sami G. March 2002, U.S. Military Presence in the Persian 






Gulf and the other members of the international community 
see Americans. 
 Chapter III will continue to examine the evolution of 
the U.S. security policy in the Middle East, focusing on 
the Post Gulf War security posture.  It will provide an 
overview of the operationalization of the security posture 
by providing details on where and what it is to include a 
description of forward deployed forces and how they have 
evolved over the last two decades.  It will discuss 
agreements which are currently in place for security in the 
region, whether formal or informal.  It will look into the 
agreements in place for the prepositioning of military gear 
and equipment in the Middle East and also the conditions in 
place for the use of host nation facilities by U.S. 
military personnel.   
 Chapter IV will provide information on emerging 
threats in the region as well as issues that could affect  
U.S. security policy.  It will focus on the security 
posture undertaken by the United States in the Post 
September 11, 2001, period.  It will discuss international 
concerns with the effect of U.S. policy on the Arab 
population.  Lastly, U.S. foreign relations with countries 
in the region will highlight potential future issues 
affecting our security posture in the area.  It will 
discuss public perception from the Middle Eastern 
perspective towards the United States foreign policy, and 
the potential impact of unfavorable public support. This 
chapter will culminate with a discussion of the prevailing 
U.S. policy to include statements made by President Bush in 
his 2002 State of the Union address where he asserted the 





 Chapter V will provide a policy analysis of the 
current Post Gulf War security posture as it relates to the 
issues presented in Chapter Four.  It will focus on the 
necessity of having a forward deployed presence in the 
Middle East as a deterrent to Saddam Hussein and for 
protection of our regional allies.  It will focus 
particularly upon the impact that the United States forward 
presence is having upon the Arab population of the region 
and discuss policy recommendations for dealing with the 
issue.  It will also discuss the relevance, if any, of a 
massive U.S. forward military presence in the region in the 




















CHAPTER II.  EVOLUTION OF U.S. SECURITY POLICY 
IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
A. EVOLUTION OF POLICY 
During the second half of the twentieth century, 
U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East 
centered on protecting the oil flow, supporting 
Israel and the region's pro-Western governments 
and maintaining political stability--not just to 
keep the status quo, but largely to deter, 
contain and, if necessary, confront communism. 
Today this list has expanded to include other 
objectives such as combating terrorism, brokering 
a truce between the Palestinians and Israelis, 
and preventing the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD). In the pursuit of these 
objectives, the United States has relied on the 
use of force, covert intervention, economic and 
military assistance, arms sales, military 
presence and diplomacy.17 
 
The United States policy of engagement in the Persian 
Gulf has been evolving since the late 1940’s.  Different 
policy makers and significant events have contributed 
greatly to the ever-increasing numbers of United States 
military personnel in the Persian Gulf region. Initially, 
the United States stationed U.S. Navy personnel in Bahrain 
for fueling purposes, while the U.S. naval vessels remained 
stationed over the horizon.18   
A major reason for this was the perceived oil shortage 
in the United States, forcing the United States Navy to 
become heavily dependent on Persian Gulf fuel supplies.  
The initial forces and support infrastructure were based in 
Bahrain which provided readily available access.  Their 
                                                 
17
 Monshipoure, Mahmood.  “The Paradoxes of U.S. policy in the Middle 
East,” Middle East Policy, vol. 9, no. 03, September, 2002. p. 66. 
18
 Palmer, Michael A.  Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s 






function was simply to help “monitor and control the 
logistical effort” of accessibility of Persian Gulf oil to 
the Navy.19  By 1951, a headquarters element, flagship, 
destroyers and aircraft were based in Bahrain. 
 The policy set forth by the United States in the 
Persian Gulf was relatively successful.  The United States 
was able to maintain its influence in the world oil market 
while limiting its military exposure in the region.  
However, when the British decided to end their protectorate 
of the region and withdrew their military forces in 1970, 
the United States was drawn increasingly into the region, 
focusing more and more of the efforts of its military into 
maintaining the stability of an increasingly unstable 
Persian Gulf environment.  With the complete British 
pullout from the region in 1970, the United States was 
forced to increase its military presence in the region for 
several reasons; but mainly, ensuring continued access to 
Persian Gulf oil and maintaining a strategic location which 
had importance in the Cold War struggle with the Soviet 
Union.   
On March 5, 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine was 
introduced as a result of increasing tensions and the 
British inability to ensure protection of Western 
influences and the ever-increasing distrust of the Soviet 
Union.  It stated that the United States was prepared to 
use force to assist any nation or group of nations against 
armed aggression from any country controlled by 
international communism.  This marked a change in the 
policy set forth by the United States and required the 
development of a military force structure that would be 
                                                 
19





able to execute large-scale combat operations in the Middle 
East.20 
The 1960’s saw little change in American Policy in the 
Middle East, despite regional instability, although foreign 
forces were committed on numerous occasions.  Egyptian 
forces intervened in Northern Yemen in their civil war and 
the United States deployed fighters to Saudi Arabia in 
Operation Hard Surface in 1965.  Tensions were beginning to 
mount in the Middle East, particularly after the 1967 Six 
Day War.  There were violent demonstrations against the 
United States that occurred in Bahrain and in Dhahran, 
Saudi Arabia.21   
 President Johnson’s attention was on Vietnam, and as 
the British continued their pullout from the Middle East, 
defense of the region was becoming a concern for the U.S.  
On July 25, 1969, the Nixon Doctrine was born, refuting the 
American role as the world’s policeman.  President Nixon 
remarked that the United States could not take the 
responsibility for the defense of developing nations, and 
that each nation should assume the responsibility for their 
own defense.  Further, the United States stood poised to 
reduce their involvement and presence from other nations’ 
affairs.22 
It was in this framework that the U.S. developed the 
Twin Pillars policy.  As the British withdrew from the 
region, the Shah of Iran filled the vacuum, allowing the 
United States to take a behind the scenes role in the 
defense of the region.  As a friend to the United States, 
the Shah and Iran benefited greatly from increased access 
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 Ibid., p. 78. 
21
 Ibid., pgs. 81-83. 
22





to Western weapons and technology, while the United States 
continued interest in maintaining access to Persian Gulf 
oil was ensured.  In an effort to calm growing Arab 
suspicions about Iran, Saudi Arabia was named as a coequal 
partner in the defense of the region.  Regional concerns 
and disagreements eventually led to an arms race between 
Iran and Saudi Arabia, but more importantly, between Iran 
and Iraq.23 
 The second half of the 1970’s brought about another 
plethora of changes in the Middle East, both internally and 
externally.  In 1977, President Carter signed the 
Presidential Review Memorandum 10, which declared the 
“Persian Gulf as a vulnerable and vital region, to which 
greater military concern ought to be given.”  In August of 
that same year, in Presidential Directive 18, President 
Carter called for the establishment of the Rapid Deployment 
Force, designed specifically to quickly respond to regions 
of national concern, signaling the growing United States 
resolve and willingness to become involved in the Persian 
Gulf region.24 
   In the 1980’s, President Carter declared “an attempt 
by any outside force to gain control of the…Persian Gulf 
region will be regarded as an assault on the vital 
interests of the United States of America, and such an 
assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including 
military force.”25 This solidified the United States 
interests in maintaining an active role in Persian Gulf 
security.  President Reagan further affirmed this policy 
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and promulgated the United States resolve to maintain the 
free flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf and to keep the 
Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s major oil chokepoints, 
open.26 
The Revolution in Iran marked a turning point for 
United States involvement in the region, creating a great 
concern with the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Mullahs 
complete rejection of the United States and Western 
influence.  The Twin pillars policy of the 1970s proved 
disastrous with the fall of Shah, and the takeover of the 
American Embassy in Tehran became a defining event for the 
United States in the Middle East.  As the United States 
entered the 1980s, policies openly acknowledged the 
necessity to defend the region.  The United States was 
increasingly drawn into the Persian Gulf in the second half 
of the 1980s by the Iran-Iraq war.  The United States 
support and favor shown toward Iraq exacerbated hostilities 
and tension between the United States and Iran and left the 
two countries on the brink of war. 
President Reagan continued to build upon the Rapid 
Deployment Force which President Carter had initiated.  The 
United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) was created in 
1983, and the commitment to the region continued to grow 
with each successive Commander in Chief (CINC).  The 
creation of USCENTCOM greatly increased U.S. focus toward 
the region and provided a conduit through which the United 
States pursued its policies and strategies for the region.  
The creation of USCENTCOM demonstrated to the world the 
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United States commitment to providing a military presence 
in the Middle East.27 
In 1984, Iran started to target oil exports to the 
West.  This was the start of the Tanker War, an escalation 
that seriously threatened the flow of oil to the West.  The 
most impacted of these moderate states was Kuwait, who, for 
security reasons that included Iraq maintaining geographic 
hegemony over the small emirate, was somewhat more overt in 
its logistical and financial support of Iraq.  Because of 
this, Iran expressly targeted Kuwaiti oil production and 
shipping.28   
The United States was drawn into an active roll in the 
Persian Gulf in 1987 when Kuwait sought out help in late 
1986 by first inquiring help from the U.S., and then, after 
an initial U.S. rejection, also opening the request to the 
Soviet Union, for protection of Kuwaiti tankers in the 
Persian Gulf.  Chiefly to counter the potential of growing 
Soviet influence in the region, the United States agreed to 
re-flag eleven Kuwaiti tankers in 1987.  This agreement 
provided protection of Kuwaiti oil tankers with the same 
level of determination that the U.S. Navy protected all 
U.S. flagships.  Because the United States rescinded their 
initial rejection and agreed to the Kuwaiti request, the 
Kuwaitis were allowed to relegate the support offered by 
the Soviets to a much smaller degree (and subsequent 
influence) than what the Soviets had offered.  In May of 
1987, the USS Stark was struck by Iraqi missiles and killed 
37 Americans, introducing the United States to the 
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potential costs involved with their continued participation 
in the Persian Gulf.29 
Tensions between the United States and Iran continued 
to grow.  Several events played out that brought the United 
States and Iran dangerously close to full-scale war.  On 
September 21, the United States Navy caught the Iranian 
amphibious ship, Iran Ajr, dropping mines in the gulf 50 
miles NE of Bahrain and subsequently attacked it.  
Additionally, on October 8, Iranian gunboats were sunk by 
U.S. helicopters.  In retaliation, the Iranians fired 
Silkworm anti-ship missiles at the re-flagged tanker Sea 
Isle City and struck it.  The U.S. Navy then further 
responded by destroying two Iranian oil platforms that were 
being used as military outposts.  These actions further 
deepened the growing commitment and involvement of the 
United States in the security of the region resulting in 
the maintenance of a much higher military presence in the 
region.30 
 Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait made necessary an 
even larger buildup of American military forces in the 
region.  After Iraq’s invasion and attempted annexation of 
Kuwait, the United States quickly showed how deep their 
resolve for the security of the region was by deploying 
500,000 troops to the region for the defense of Kuwait.  Of 
course, the end of the Persian Gulf War brought a mass 
reduction of those forces deployed to the region, however, 
the United States left a much larger contingent in place 
than had ever been there before.  The numbers have 
continued to grow since that point.  The United States 
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commitment to the region was and continues to be in full 
force. 
 Since the end of the Persian Gulf War, the United 
States has been very active in implementing and maintaining 
its four pronged security approach of: ensuring access to 
host nation facilities for ongoing operations and 
contingencies through bilateral agreements; prepositioning 
military equipment; building host nation self-defense 
capabilities through foreign military sales, training and 
joint exercises; and providing a continuously deployed 
forward U.S. military presence in the region.31  The 
military footprint is growing larger and is being 
maintained on a near continuous basis.   
Various Defense Cooperation Agreements have been made 
with Oman (1990), Saudi Arabia (1990), Bahrain (1990), 
Kuwait (1991), Qatar (1992), and the UAE (1994).32  These 
agreements vary and the details are classified, but the end 
results allow the United States to maintain a force 
presence in the region, utilize host country bases and air 
stations, and preposition equipment.  The agreements also 
entail the specifics on paying the costs for these security 
arrangements, the majority of which is covered by the 
Persian Gulf States. 
 As shown, the United States policy as protectorate of 
the Persian Gulf region has evolved over several decades.  
The United States did not start off with the intention of 
ever stationing large numbers of U.S. military personnel in 
the region in case a contingency occurred.  However, the 
growing volatility of the area combined with the great 
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distrust the United States has toward Iran and Iraq has 
resulted in the ever increasing footprint of the U.S. 
military in the region.   
The American policies being promulgated against Arab 
countries have increased the strain felt by the Arab 
populace.  Regardless of how helpful U.S. policies toward 
Iraq may be for other Arab countries in the region, the 
refusal to deal with the same resolve toward other Arab 
issues such as the Middle East Peace Process is resulting 
in the growing dissatisfaction and resentment against the 
United States having a forward deployed military presence 
in the region at all for any reason.  
B. AVAILABLE STRATEGIES 
 The United States has historically utilized a variety 
of policy umbrellas to promulgate its interests around the 
world.  From the basic to the intricate, each policy met 
with varying degrees of success, with no one policy rising 
to the surface as the answer.  In a dynamic environment 
such as the Persian Gulf, the United States stalwart 
commitment to the security of its national interests is one 
of the few reasons that there is any stability at all in 
the region.  There has not been a single policy able to 
accomplish all of the objectives the United States has in 
the Persian Gulf region.  The United States continues to 
utilize whatever policy best seems to fit the particular 
issue at hand.  Those policies continue to evolve; however, 
the basis for those policies continues to remain the same.  
As President Bush stated in his speech at West Point on 
June 1, 2002, “Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic 
or impolite to speak the language of right and wrong.  I 





methods, but not different moralities.”33  A brief 
description of some of the various policies that the United 
States has employed is as follows.  
1. Deterrence   
The mere forward presence of the American military 
serves notice to those who may aggressively challenge the 
United States or its allies, that America is able and 
willing to quickly react to eliminate a potential threat.  
The majority of states utilize the strategy of deterrence 
in one form or another.  Whether it is a powerful nation 
trying to intimidate another nation and either stop an 
action from occurring or ending it when it does, or a 
lesser nation trying to impose its will on another, 
deterrence is part of the strategy.  Voluntary cooperation 
is easier to obtain if the nation has the capability of 
striking back.  Deterrence can involve the use of force or 
the mere threat of the use of force.  It sends the signal 
that there will be consequences for an action or continued 
action.34  
2. Containment   
The strategy of containment evolved during the Cold 
War era when the United States feared the expansion of 
Communism and the Soviet Union.  Containment came about as 
an American response to an article written by George 
Kennan, published under the pseudonym “X” in Foreign 
Affairs in July of 1947, called “The Sources of Soviet 
Conduct.”  He stated that the Soviet empire was going to 
become increasingly difficult to deal with, but that the 
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United States had within its power to substantially 
increase the strains under which Soviet power must operate.  
While waiting for the Soviet Union to relinquish its status 
as Communist and behave according to generally accepted 
norms for international behavior, the United States 
concentrated on containing Soviet expansion.35 
3. Dual Containment 
The Dual Containment policy came about in the 1990’s 
during the Clinton Administration.  It was essentially a 
response to the perceived growing instability in the Middle 
East, particularly with Iran and Iraq.  Dual Containment 
involved the containment of both Iran and Iraq in an effort 
to stabilize the region and keep the regimes in power from 
pushing their will on their neighbors.  In its efforts to 
weaken the two nations, Dual Containment was largely 
executed with economic sanctions emplaced upon Iran by the 
United States and upon Iraq by the United Nations.  Forces 
were maintained in the surrounding region, particularly in 
Saudi Arabia and Turkey, to enforce the no-fly zones in 
Iraq.  This was unique from Iran in that it essentially 
formed an internal containment upon Saddam Hussein, greatly 
hindering his ability to aggressively influence the 
different ethnic populations of his own country.36  
4. The Bush Doctrine 
President Bush Jr. set forth a policy of preemption in 
the September, 2002, version of the National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America.  Preemption gives 
the United States the ability to act preemptively on the 
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existence of an imminent threat in self-defense.37  It takes 
away the reactive stance of the nation and fills the gap 
with a proactive stance towards the eradication of threats 
against the United States and its allies.38  Instead of 
waiting for an attack to occur again the United States, if 
America receives a legitimate threat, it will strike first.  
This is based upon the concept that “international law 
recognizes that nations need not suffer an attack before 
they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against 
forces that present an imminent danger of attack.”39  
Preemption could be called one of the most stringent forms 
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CHAPTER III.  EVOLUTION OF U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE 
We need prepositioning in the region because it 
cuts the time necessary to bring in large-scale 
forces. We also need a very balanced exercise 
program that permits us periodically to come-
balanced in the sense that it does things that 
are mutually beneficial to their military and 
ours, assuring that we're favorably received.  We 
need forward-presence forces on a temporary 
basis-obviously naval forces, air expeditionary 
forces, plus ground forces in Kuwait.  We can 
adjust the frequency of their deployment or the 
length of their stay depending on our threat 
assessment.40 
 
Forward presence “demonstrates U.S. commitment, 
facilitates access, enhances deterrence, and supports 
transition from peace to war.”41  The total forward presence 
would be the sum of U.S. military forces in theatre; 
prepositioned equipment and military construction designed 
for a fluid rapid deployment to the region; as well as 
ongoing military operations, security assistance, and 
exercises. 
 There are many reasons for having a capable forward 
presence in the Middle East.  The objectives for USCENTCOM 
include:  deterring aggression while demonstrating U.S. 
commitment; protect shipping and enforcing UN resolutions; 
theatre missile defense; gaining and maintaining access and 
influence; enhancing interoperability and military to 
military contacts; in-place crisis response; and easing the 
transition from peace to war.42 
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 The United States has assumed almost total 
responsibility for Persian Gulf security since the end of 
the Gulf War.  This has required many formal and informal 
security arrangements with the Gulf countries.  The Arab 
leaders all believe that the presence of the U.S. military 
in the region helps to preserve stability as long as it is 
maintained with a low visibility.43  Because of regional 
sensitivities, however, the United States is currently not 
allowed to permanently base U.S. forces in many Gulf 
countries.  The extent of forward deployed military 
personnel was noted by General Franks (Commander in Chief, 
USCENTCOM) in March, 2001, to be between 18,500 and 25,000 
uniformed men and women, the majority of which are in place 
to enforce the no-fly zones in Iraq.44 
A. BREAKDOWN OF THE U.S. MILITARY FOOTPRINT 
The United States maintains the bulk of its forward 
military presence in the following countries in the Persian 
Gulf:  Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and 
Oman.  A large majority of that number, however, is afloat, 
and will not be counted in the country by country analysis 
of forces in-country. 
1. Measuring Current Presence  
The numbers of U.S. military forces in Middle Eastern 
countries have significantly increased over the last two 
decades.  When compared with the numbers tabulated by the 
Department of Defense45 in 2001 with the numbers published 
in 1980, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, 
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and Oman have all seen substantial increases in the number 
of U.S. military personnel forward deployed on their soil. 
a. Saudi Arabia   
The majority of U.S. military personnel in Saudi  
Arabia are located at Prince Sultan Airbase and at Eskan 
Village.46  In 1980, the United States had a total of 502 
military personnel in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  There 
was a tremendous buildup of U.S. forces prior to the Gulf 
war, with the numbers beginning to level out in 1992 and 
1993, with only 710 U.S. military troops remaining in 1994.  
That number began to marginally increase annually after 
that, with a significant upturn in 1998, 1999, and 2000, 
when the number of U.S. military personnel had increased to 
7053.  2001 brought the first decrease of U.S. forces in 
the region, lowering the number substantially to 4805.  
This number is over 900% of the forces which the United 
States had in country in 1980.  
b. Kuwait   
Kuwait had a finite U.S. military presence in  
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1980, and it was not until the Gulf war that the numbers 
went up.  The number of U.S. military personnel spiked 
dramatically following the conflict, and reached a low of 
233 in 1993.  Two years later, in 1995, that number had 
risen over 300% to 771.  The spike in 1996 was due to 
Operation Desert Strike which was carried out on September 
4, 1996.47  In 2000, the number of U.S. military personnel 
in the country had increased dramatically, to 4602, before 
it again lowered in 2001.  Compared to the paltry number of 
personnel shortly after the gulf war, Kuwait’s portion of 
U.S. military personnel has exploded, leaving Kuwait second 
only to Saudi Arabia in total numbers of U.S. military 
personnel stationed or temporarily residing on their soil, 
the majority of which are at Ali Al Salem, Ahmed Al Jaber, 
and Camp Doha.48  
 c. Oman   
Oman has only in recent years begun to see an 
increase in the amount of U.S. military personnel on their 
soil mainly located at Seeb, Fujairah, and Masirah.49  The 
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first real rise came in 1998 as the numbers climbed to 97 
from what had averaged around 25-30 since 1985.  Two years 
later, in 2000, that number had increased to 251, with 
another significant rise to 673 in 2001.  So, in a very 
short time, Oman has seen a substantial increase in U.S. 
military personnel in-country.   The majority of the U.S. 
military personnel are in Oman’s capital, Muscat, although 
Oman is busy building a new airbase in Al Musnana’h, with a 
runway suitable for the B-52 bombers.50 
 
d.  United Arab Emirates   
Like Oman, the UAE has also seen the U.S.  
military presence increase on its soil in recent years.  The 
first substantial increase came in 1998 when the numbers 
increased from an average between 20 and 30 up to 313.  
1999 brought another substantial increase to a peak of 679, 
but that number has dropped steadily into 2001, where 204 
U.S. military personnel remained in the UAE.  The U.S. 
military has no established bases to call its own, but the 
U.S. military presence in the UAE is mainly confined to 
airbases in Abu Dhabi, which U.S. reconnaissance aircraft 
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and refueling tankers routinely use.51  There are also 
military personnel at Jebel Ali, and Al Dhafra.52 
     Additionally, Bahrain is home to the U.S. Navy’s 
Fifth Fleet, which consisted of 20 ships, 66 aircraft, and 
11, 871 sailors and Marines in November of 2000.53  There 
are also U.S. military troops in Manama.54  Figure 5 shows 
the American presence in Egypt.  Although there are no 
permanently stationed forces there, Egypt hosts numerous 
exercises and the number of Military Forces fluctuates 
considerably.  
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Figure 4.  United Arab Emirates







































































2. Prepositioned Military Equipment 
 According to the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, 
“deterrence in the future will continue to depend heavily 
upon the capability resident in forward stationed and 
forward deployed combat and expeditionary forces.”55  It 
also states that “The U.S. military has an existing 
shortfall in strategic transport aircraft.”56  The United 
States strategy of deterrence relies heavily on the ability 
to get well supplied military personnel to a potential 
hotspot quickly.  One of the ways the United States is able 
to do that is through the prepositioning of military 
equipment. 
 The United States Army has a complete set of equipment 
for an armored brigade prepositioned in Kuwait,57 while 
there is another prepositioned store in Qatar at Al Udeid 
airbase.  This prepositioned store contains equipment for 
an armored brigade at the minimum.58  The United States also 
maintains another load of military equipment for an armored 
brigade afloat in the region.59  In addition, the United 
States has “Air Force bare base sets, water and fuel 
distribution equipment, medical equipment and supplies, and 
support vehicles.”60  The Air Force maintains their base 
sets in Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait.61 
  The United States has had an agreement with Oman for 
prepositioning equipment and emergency access to Omani 
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bases since 1980.  Defense Cooperation agreements have been 
signed with Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab 
Emirates.62  These agreements permit access and allow for 
the prepositioning of equipment in their prospective 
regions.  These agreements have, historically, allowed for 
a very quick response to the region in times of crisis.   
3. Military Exercises 
 Military exercises play a large role in engagement 
activities as they provide opportunities for combined 
training and education, humanitarian assistance, security 
assistance and other vital functions.  This high level of 
nation to nation military interaction dictates strong 
relationships and security agreements, ensuring U.S. access 
to host nation facilities.  Military contact also improves 
relations with host nations by sustaining a high level of 
interaction which “allows for discussion of issues, 
develops individual relationships, and builds trust, 
confidence, and cohesion.”63 
 Exercises in the region have appeared to be in decline 
in recent years.  In 1993, USCENTCOM had 138 exercises 
scheduled throughout its area of responsibility to include 
Southwest Asia.  These exercises had declined to 62 in 
1997, and are declining still.  A large portion of these 
exercises are also conducted utilizing U.S. military 
personnel which are already in the region, although, a 
large number of forces are still deployed to support 
exercises in the region.  This accounts for part of the 
large fluctuations of military presence in the region.64 
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 The DOD regards exercises as a critical way of keeping 
a forward based U.S. military presence in a region.65  These 
exercises allow for a constant flow of combat troops into 
the region and maintain a check on the abilities to 
reengage with equipment already prepositioned. 
A partial listing of exercises by country follows66: 
 
• Oman: Accurate Test, Beacon Flash, Inferno Creek, and 
Sea Soldier 
• Kuwait: Eager Mace, Indigo Desert, Intrinsic Action 
(3xYear), Iris Gold, Lucky Sentinel, and Ultimate 
Resolve 
• UAE: Iron Magic 
• Saudi Arabia: Earnest Leader, Emerald Falcon, Indigo 
Musket, Nautical Artist, Nautical Mantis, and Red Reef 
• Jordan: Eager Light, Eager Tiger, Early Victor, 
Infinite Acclaim, and Infinite Moonlight 
• Qatar: Earnest Action, Earnest Maverick, Eastern 
Viper, Impelling Victory, Indigo Desert, and Native 
Fury 
• Egypt: Bright Star, Eagle Arena, Eager Salute, and 
Iron Cobra 
• Bahrain: Inherent Fury, Initial Link, and Neon Falcon 
 
  For purposes of this research, the remainder of the 
document will focus on two countries with a high level of 
American military presence: Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; the 
opinions of the populations of two countries with a medium 
to low level of military presence: the United Arab Emirates 
and Egypt; and then compare them to the opinions of the 
populations of two countries without a U.S. Military 
presence: Lebanon, and Iran.  This information is 
diagrammed in Figure 6.  In September, 2001, Saudi Arabia 
had 4805 U.S. military members in country; Kuwait had 4208 
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U.S. military members in country; Egypt had 500 U.S. 
military members in country; the United Arab Emirates had 
204 U.S. military members in country; Lebanon had 3 U.S. 
military members in country; and Iran had 0 U.S. military 
members in country. 
 
B. SECURITY CHALLENGES, OR CONSEQUENCES? 
Former Secretary of Defense William Cohen listed five 
categories of security challenges facing the United States 
in the Persian Gulf region: cross-border conflict, internal 
conflict, proliferation of dangerous military technologies, 
transnational threats, and humanitarian threats.67  Included 
in his security concerns were unconventional attacks 
against the U.S. military.  This concern was directly 
related to the presence of the military in the Persian 
Gulf.68  
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It must be noted that the majority of Muslims do not 
follow or endorse the teachings of Osama bin Laden or those 
who call for violence.  Most are content to vent their 
frustrations in peaceful rallies and demonstrations.  It is 
the radical few who feel led to utilize violence as a means 
to further their cause.   
Attacks on U.S. forces and property in the Middle East 
can be directly tied to the rising opposition to the United 
States military presence in the Persian Gulf, if only to 
the opportunity it represents to attack a major symbol of 
the sovereignty of the United States.  The United States 
presents itself as an inviting target, enticing those who 
stand willing to rise up against a foreign presence on 
their soil. 
1. Khobar Towers and the U.S.S. COLE 
The United States presence in the Middle East has 
proven to be an irresistible target for violence by those 
opposed to the United States maintaining a forward presence 
the region.  There have been several incidents which have 
shown the apparent vulnerability of the United States to 
unconventional violence.  The bombing of Riyadh in November 
of 1995; the bombing of the Khobar Towers near Dhahran in 
June of 1996; and the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen 
in October of 2000 all illustrate the potential costs of 
the U.S. continued forward presence.  They also serve as 
remarkable examples of how “symbol and opportunity” can be 
utilized by the disenfranchised few who are willing to put 
it all on the line for their cause.  The United States can 
no longer expect passivity when it forward deploys its 
forces.  The message very well may be coming more clear to 





United States is not untouchable, and that damage can, 
indeed, be inflicted.69 
2. September 11, 2001 
Moving from the Middle East, the September 11, 2001, 
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon equate 
to an escalation of the conflict and a willingness to take 
the fight to the enemy.  It marks a shift in the norm of 
Islamic fundamentalists who generally attack local areas of 
concern.  In this regard, it gives credence to taking into 
account the opinions of the nations where you do business.  
They may no longer be satisfied with attacking local 
targets; there may have been a paradigm shift.  Although 
the magnitude of the damage and loss of life shocked many 
of those with anti-U.S. tendencies, the public outcry in 
the Arab world against those actions was minimal.  Years 
prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks it was noted that 
public dissent in the Arab world with the United States had 
grown to a point where there was a feeling of satisfaction 
that America may have gotten what it deserved in reference 
to Khobar Towers.70 This sentiment has not changed, it has 
only deepened.  
C. OUR OWN WORST ENEMY? (GALLUP POLL) 
Gallup conducted interviews of over 10,000 Muslims in 
nine countries in December, 2001 through January, 2002. 
Although the results of this poll have been criticized,71 
they are worth noting as the poll demonstrated a deep 
alienation from and lack of empathy of Muslims with the 
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United States. Here are some of the highlights of this 
poll: 
• 61% of the respondents said they did not believe Arab 
groups were behind the Sept 11 attacks.  
• 67% thought the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan following 
the attacks was unjustified, with 9% thinking it was.  
• The poll confirms a widespread unfavorable opinion of 
the U.S. in the Muslim world - 53% - with less than 
half of that - 22% - holding a positive opinion.72  
 
Respondents in the survey were asked a number of 
questions in regards to the September 11, 2001, attacks, 
the United States response to those attacks, and the United 
States in general.  If foreign public perception plays a 
role in the actions taken by the United States, then 
America would be prudent to step back and evaluate where it 
is headed.  Even in Kuwait, 36% of the respondents thought 
that the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and 
Pentagon was morally justified.  Only 12% of the 
respondents thought that the West respects Islamic or Arab 
values, while 53% perceives the United States unfavorably.  
The poll goes on, but the figures already listed clearly 
describe the road upon which the United States is 
traveling. 73  
The results of the poll are disturbing when one thinks 
that one out of every two Muslims has a negative view of 
the United States, and a large number disbelieve the 
evidence provided that Arab men were responsible for the 
September 11, 2001, attacks.  The feeling is that the 
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United States is conjuring up images which are anti-Muslim 
in an effort to single them out and gain American popular 
support for a perceived war against Islam.  One out of 
































CHAPTER IV.  THE RUMBLINGS OF PUBLIC DISSENT 
The United States footprint continues to grow.  
Although near permanent facilities are being constructed 
and are being utilized for equipment storage, the rulers of 
the Persian Gulf States are quite adamant that U.S. 
military forces are only there temporarily.  This has been 
reinforced recently with rumors beginning to surface of 
Saudi Arabia asking the U.S. to leave.  Public dissent has 
grown to a level where many of the agreements with the 
United States are being made in “the shadows,” while Arab 
rulers are maintaining a “get tough” stance toward the U.S. 
in their public eyes.74 
Forward presence has put a strain on some 
relationships. If it's very visible, it can be 
counterproductive. We look for ways to lower the 
visibility. In part, we emphasize the 
prepositioning of equipment; we also look for 
bases that don't put us in areas where we're very 
visible. It's best to preposition and have low 
numbers of people off to the side. Low visibility 
basing is real important.75 
 
 Arab rulers are fighting to maintain legitimacy in the 
eyes of their public in large part because of the growing 
sentiment of U.S. fault for the “growing misery in their 
lands.”76  Osama bin Laden made an emotional call to the 
people of Islam to turn from its associations with the U.S. 
…(T)he United States has been occupying the lands 
of Islam in the holiest of its territories, 
Arabia, plundering its riches, overwhelming its 
rulers, humiliating its people, threatening its 
neighbors, and using its peninsula as a spearhead 
to fight the neighboring Islamic peoples. 
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Bin Laden also called on all Muslims to join the war 
against the powers of the West.77 
The Islamist movements that have emerged out of the 
failures of secularist regimes and opposition movements may 
present further challenges to American interests in the 
Middle East.  “Whereas a generation ago Arab nationalists 
and some progressive grassroots movements challenged 
Western hegemony, nowadays the radicals are religious 
conservatives who oppose regional regimes and have proven 
to be effective foes of Israeli conquests as well.”78  
A.  A COMPARISON OF THE SENTIMENT IN COUNTRIES WITH U.S.  
MILITARY PRESENCE TO THE SENTIMENT IN COUNTRIES 
WITHOUT A U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE (ZOGBY POLL) 
 
Utilizing the data set forth in the Zogby poll, this 
paper will now look at the opinions of the populations of 
two countries with a high level of American military 
presence: Kuwait79 and Saudi Arabia;80 two countries with a 
medium level of military presence: the United Arab 
Emirates81 and Egypt,82; and then compare them to two 
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countries without a U.S. Military presence: Lebanon,83 and 
Iran.84  Some interesting trends were noticed as I looked 
specifically at the cultural aspects which were measured: 
the attitudes toward American people, American freedom and 
democracy, American science and technology, American-made 
products, and American movies and television, and compared 
them with the opinions on American foreign policy: U.S. 
policy toward Palestine, U.S. policy toward Arab nations, 
the importance of the Palestinian issue, Palestine, 
American efforts to free Kuwait, and whether there was 
support for the continued U.S.-led war on terrorism.  
Of interest to note are some of the prevailing 
attitudes the populations of the countries polled had 
toward Americans.  In countries with governments that 
support and allow a high percentage of American  military 
presence in their countries, you might expect a high 
opinion of Americans with opinion beginning to drop in 
countries that do not support a high presence.  However, as 
you can see in Figure 7, the highest favorable attitude 
towards Americans comes from Lebanon, which does not have 
an American military presence, and the countries that do, 
all have favorability ratings of less than 50%.  Another 
interesting note is that Egypt only shows one percentage 
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point greater than Iran in its outlook toward Americans, 
and Egypt is considered a strong ally of the United States.   
The opinions toward American freedom and democracy 
(Figure 8) are mostly positive, but with less of a gap.  
This means that there are significant high numbers of 
people with negative opinions toward what the United States 
ultimately stands for.  There is very little difference 
noted, with the exception of Iran, between the nations with 
a high level of military presence and a lower lever level 
of military presence.  Of interest are the high marks given 
by Lebanon, which are not exceeded by any of American’s 
allies.  
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American science and technology receives high marks 
across the board, regardless of the stance taken by 
different governments to limit its availability (shown in 
Figure 9).  An interesting cultural observation was the 
favorability towards American science and technology found 
in nations without high U.S. presence.    Of interest is 
the very high favorability towards American science and 
technology that is found in Iran as it beats out all of the 
other nations in its pro-Western thinking.  Saudi Arabia’s 
population, whose ruling regime is one of the leading 
buyers of American military technology gives the lowest 
favorability ratings.   
 
 
American-made products (Figure 10) received relatively 
high marks by those taking the poll.  Of interest, though, 
is that in Egypt, with a medium to low military presence 
but a strong ally, and Saudi Arabia, with a high level of 
military presence, there is a much smaller gap in the 
between those favorable and those who are not. 
 



























American movies and television receive (Figure 11) 
very high ratings, even in Iran, whose conservative regime 
pushes for the complete rejection of things American.  In 
those countries which the United States considers allies 
and harbors a U.S. military presence, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
and Kuwait, there is less of a consensus.  
Americans generally received high marks in regards to 
culture throughout the countries polled.  The marks were 
generally favorable regardless of the level of U.S. 
military presence in the country.  However, there was a 
slight decrease overall in the favorability rates in 
countries with U.S. military presence.   
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In matters of foreign policy, however, this begins to 
change.  American culture covers only a small portion of 
the huge public outcry in the Arab world.  The fact that 
the military is the most visible aspect of American foreign 
policy must be taken into consideration when looking at the 
outcry towards American policies.  
The perceived American policy toward Arab nations 
(shown in Figure 12) was very negative, with almost non-
existent positives.  The UAE was also the only Arab nation 
to show a double digit support for U.S. policy toward Arab 
nations.  Even Kuwait, whom you would expect to have a very 
high opinion of the United States in this matter only 
provided a 5% approval rating.  Both Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait had lower opinions than Lebanon, who only gave 9% 
approval.   
In regards to the United States policy towards 
Palestine (shown in Figure 13), the United States receives 
very low marks.  Nations with a strong U.S. footprint 
reported an extremely negative viewpoint, which was in 
keeping with the other countries shown in the survey.  The 
only country which gave support into the double digits was 
the UAE.  Kuwait provided the least favorable approval 



























rating of all the countries surveyed, coming in at 2%, 
while its unfavorable percentage of 94% was second only to 
Iran, coming in at 96% of respondents having an unfavorable 
viewpoint.  
 
Protesting the Israeli raids on the Palestinian 
settlements in the West Bank, thousands of protestors 
surged on the U.S. embassy. In Saudi Arabia, 2000 people 
ignored a ban and demonstrated outside of the U.S. 
consulate in Dhahran.  There was also a protest march in 
al-Qatif.  In addition, Queen Rania of Jordan has taken to 
the streets in defiance of Israeli actions.85 
“Conservative Persian Gulf Arab states have found 
themselves walking a tightrope as public anger mounts… 
[against the U.S.] for its pro-Israeli bias.”86  The 
importance of this issue is clearly shown in Figure 14.  
The Palestinian issue can be clearly seen to be a very 
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important issue.  Iran’s marks are surprising, though, 
given their support for groups fighting for independence. 
 
 
To show the state of concern with the 
Israeli/Palestinian issue, Shibley Telhami writes, “In a 
survey last month of Saudi elites—defined as media 
professionals, academics and chamber of commerce members—43 
percent said that their frustrations with the United States 
would be completely removed, and 23 percent said they would 
be significantly reduced, if America brokered a just and 
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lasting peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict.”87  This is 
clearly seen in Figure 15.  He added, “When asked if their 
attitudes toward the United States were mostly based on its 
policies or on its values, 86 percent answered politics.”88  
The results of the data from the polling questions 
asked about the American led military efforts to free 
Kuwait (Figure 16) are also interesting.  Kuwait clearly 
appreciated it.  But the results are not impressive 
anywhere else.  In fact, all of the other countries this 
paper is looking at showed a negative perception of the 
United States using military force, even if it was for the 
benefit of an Arab state.  The results in Saudi Arabia 
clearly show the trend against the American use of force in 
the region.  As home to the largest number of American 
troops in the region, this is cause for concern.  
 
The military footprint alone, as an instrument of U.S. 
policy, is insufficient to explain the negative public 
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opinion the United States has with the populations of the 
Middle East.  The suffering of the Iraqi people in light of 
the U.S. initiated economic sanctions and the seemingly 
two-faced unrelenting American support of Israel greatly 
contribute to the feeling that the United States is not 
concerned with, and is indifferent toward the greater good 
and concerns of Arabs while protecting its own national 
interests.89  
B. THE BIG ISSUES 
1. Dissent for U.S. Support of Israel and the Middle 
   East Peace Process 
 
The United States has shown a strong support for the 
state of Israel since Israel achieved statehood.  “For 
decades our great leaders have been yielding to ‘special 
interest groups’ in this country and, as a result, 
committing the U.S. to policies that betray our national 
interests. For decades our great leaders have been 
undermining the efforts of a people that are struggling for 
the same basic rights that our forefathers fought for 
centuries ago.”90  
Even though there seems to be a unified front in the 
United States for the support of Israel, this support is 
not universal around the world.  Specifically, in the Arab 
world, there is a backlash against the United States for 
its support of Israel, both in the political and public 
spheres.  This is made quite clear in a letter written by 
Safar Ibn Abd Al-Rahman Al-Hawali, a famous Saudi Islamist, 
to President Bush on October 15th, 2001, when he lashed out 
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against the actions taken by the President following the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.  Although, his 
letter was a call for the end of the violent methods that 
Americans are utilizing in Afghanistan and a stark defense 
of Islam and Muslims in general, the writer found the space 
to take the United States stance towards Israel as a 
target.  “Their trust was not shaken even by its unjust 
position concerning the establishment of the Jewish state 
and the deprivation of the Palestinian people of their 
right to self-determination.”91   
The letter also pointed out some of the perceptions 
Arabs have of American political rhetoric towards bombing 
in Israel and Palestine.92  It does not take much to read 
through the lines and get at Al-Hawali’s insinuations.  As 
a Muslim supporter of Palestine, he clearly finds the 
United States public statements as ignorant and false.  It 
seems that Americans are close-minded when it comes to 
actions by their allies, regardless of how brutal. 
The United States has repeatedly shown support for 
Israeli actions that are just as violent as or worse than 
the Palestinian actions.  We give legitimacy to Israel as a 
state, and none to the Palestinians, conveniently ignoring 
that Palestine is being illegally occupied by Israel as 
defined by International Law.  While Americans continue to 
buy this logic, most Arabs do not, and are growing 
increasingly dissatisfied with the United States. 
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Even our allies in the Persian Gulf are beginning to 
distance themselves from the United States.  With the 
recent unrest in Palestine and Israel, the American foreign 
policy has taken a beating.  Many of our allies find it 
difficult to support the war on terrorism (Figure 17) while 
the United States continues to ignore Israeli aggression 
towards Palestine.  President Bush’s hand off approach has 
been publicly called into question by the leaders of Arab 
nations, who played the upper hand and essentially forced 
the United States to get involved.   The Saudi Crown Prince 
Abdullah warned President Bush that the anger toward Israel 
and the United States is enormous, and he strongly urged 
the United States to take an “aggressive and personal role” 
towards a peace settlement.  He stated, “The message is 
very clear. The U.S. is an important player. For the 
situation to improve, the United States will have to carry 
its responsibility.”93  
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 Despite the backlash, the United States does have a 
strategic interest in the peace process between Israel and 
Palestine.  The Commission on U.S. and Israeli Relations 
believes that “the post-Cold War era of Arab-Israeli 
negotiations provides a new strategic validity for the 
U.S.-Israel relationship. Peace could promote stability in 
a volatile area of vital interest to the United States and 
provide the most effective way of reconciling America's 
stake in Israel's security and its stake in good relations 
with key Arab states.”94  
2. Sanctions on Iraq 
At the end of the Persian Gulf War, there was a 
general consensus among the Persian Gulf States and other 
members of the coalition against Iraq that sanctions would 
be an efficient way to maintain control over Saddam Hussein 
in order to curb further potential aggressive action and 
maintain stability in the Middle East.95  Initially, the 
sanctions were quite successful in accomplishing these 
objectives.  However, as time went on, the world began to 
receive glimpses of the suffering of the Iraqi population.  
This, combined with Saddam Hussein’s ability to manipulate 
the sanctions and continue to gain concessions, contributed 
to a decrease in world support for sanctions. 
 Saddam was also able to utilize an effective 
information campaign which attributed the suffering of the 
Iraqi people to the indifferent and hard-lined stance of 
the Americans.  The insistence of the complete dismantling 
of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a 
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condition to stop the sanctions did little to endear the 
United States to the Arab world as it clearly watched the 
indifference the United States had to Israel’s WMD 
program.96 A decade after the implementation of the 
sanctions, the majority of the Arab world still blames the 
United States for the atrocities that Saddam Hussein 
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CHAPTER V.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
MEQ: Do you make efforts to convey the right 
image of American troops?  Zinni: Very much so. 
We participate in de-mining programs and various 
humanitarian programs. We are now working 
with the militaries to demonstrate how to respect 
and be good stewards of the environment, and how 
the military can maintain environmental standards 
of protection concerning such things as hazardous 
waste handling and removal. We hope the 
populations will look at the U.S. military not as 
threatening and not as a colonial power. We hope 
they won't buy into the extremists' ways of 
portraying us. Some leaders in our AOR recommend 
that our military leaders be more accessible to 
their media, to give us a human face. They ought 
to see a face and hear our words. It's a good 
idea, for people should see us-even if they do 
throw hard questions at us, questions we can't 




It is at this point of the paper that an attempt will 
be made to answer the research questions posed at the 
beginning.  The first question posed was: would a reduction 
in the current US security posture of physical presence in 
the Middle East designed to bolster foreign public opinion 
continue to protect US national interests in the region?  
The data seems to indicate that a reduction in forces would 
bolster public perceptions.  Once Saddam Hussein’s future 
in Iraq is clear, the United States should put the security 
of the region back upon the Persian Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) states and return to an “over the horizon” 
security posture. 
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 The second research question posed was: should our 
response to regional threats remain the same, or be 
altered?  As demonstrated quite clearly in the polls, the 
Israel/Palestine peace process needs to be a priority in US 
policy-makers agendas.  An answer to that dilemma will help 
diminish the need for such a large US presence in the 
region.  The sanctions on Iraq need an overhaul, or just 
need to be done away with.  Whatever route, the United 
States should be very concerned with the fate of the Iraqi 
population, if only from a humanitarian view.   
 The hypothesis of this thesis, “the United States 
military’s physical presence in the Middle East is a 
leading cause of dissent among Arab nationals,” is 
accurate.  As the United States has increased its role in 
the security of the region over the last several decades, 
Arab opinion of the United States has spiraled downward.  
In some instances, the United States military has been 
openly attacked by those who oppose the U.S. presence in 
the region.  The outcry against U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia 
continues to mount, despite the attempts to hide them deep 
in the desert.  Although Saudi Arabia is somewhat dependent 
upon the United States to provide for its security and 
allows the highest numbers of U.S. military personnel into 
their country, public perceptions in Saudi Arabia towards 
the United States and its policies are some of the lowest 
in the region.  The Saud family is intent to deal secretly 
with the United States while publicly denouncing and 
restricting U.S. intentions in the region.  This can only 
hinder U.S. relations with the Saudi people, and the “cat 
and mouse” game may ultimately catch up with these tactics 





An analysis of the two countries with a high U.S. 
military presence, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, is troubling.  
Saudi Arabia leads the countries surveyed in its negative 
view of Americans with a 51% unfavorable opinion and 
American science and technology with 26% expressing an 
unfavorable opinion.  Kuwait has the highest negative 
opinion, 44%, toward American movies and television, with 
Saudi Arabia coming in a close second with 42% expressing 
negative views.  Kuwait also gives the lowest approval 
rating for the United States policy toward Palestine, 2%.  
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are tied for the highest negative 
opinions toward U.S. policies toward Arab nations with both 
nations coming in with 88% of those surveyed having an 
unfavorable opinion.  The United States did well in its 
efforts to free Kuwait in Kuwait’s opinion, with 83% being 
favorable, but Saudi Arabia led all nations surveyed with a 
59% disapproval rating. 
Although Kuwait (87%) and Saudi Arabia (79%) would 
react most favorably of the nations surveyed should the 
United States become involved in the Arab troubles against 
Israel and manage to solve the Middle East Peace Process 
and establish an independent Palestinian state, both 
nations have a very disturbing stance toward the American 
efforts to fight terrorism, which is in my opinion, where 
the line should be drawn in the sand.  The high negative 
opinions, 65% for Kuwait and 57% for Saudi Arabia, are 
behind only Egypt, (another ally of the United States) 
coming in at 67%, and Iran, who has been named as a state 
sponsor of Terrorism coming in at 98%.  This clearly shows 
that the allies of the United States support American 





are again American efforts to increase their own security.  
Although these two nations house the majority of American 
troops in the region, they appear to allow their presence 
for their own benefit.  President Bush’s statement, “You 
are either for us, or against us” may prove prophetic as we 
may see the “true colors” of our allies in the Middle East 
as we continue to promulgate the War on Terror. 
The responses of the two nations which house only a 
medium to low level of military presence, Egypt and the 
United Arab Emirates, is not as disturbing.  The UAE gives 
the United States its highest favorability rating for its 
war on terrorism, although it is still only a minority 37% 
approval rating. The UAE also gives the United States the 
highest approval ratings for its policy toward Palestine 
and its policies toward Arab nations, although they are 
only a paltry 10% and 15% respectively.  Of interest is how 
the UAE’s results are quite similar to that of Lebanon and 
Iran in how well perceived American-made products and 
American movies and television are. 
Egypt, however, seems to follow Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia in how its public perceives the United States.  
Egypt gives the United States very low favorability rating 
in its policies toward Palestine, 3%, and its policies 
toward Arab nations, 4%.  As said before, Egypt is second 
only behind Iran in its negative opinions about the United 
States war against terrorism.  Egypt also has the second 
lowest approval ratings, with only Iran being lower, for 
the United States policies toward Arab nations (4%).  






It is interesting to note that the questions about 
Americans and American cultural aspects received the 
greatest favorability ratings on average in Lebanon and 
Iran, who do not have an American military presence, while 
questions about American polices received the worst ratings 
in countries that are home to members of the United States 
military, with the exception of Iran in certain instances.  
As the United States military is a very visible aspect of 
American foreign policy in the Middle East, it is very 
troubling that the worst foreign policy opinions are in 
those countries with the highest levels of U.S. military 
presence in the region.  
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The data in this thesis supports a conclusion that the 
forward deployment of U.S. military personnel has helped 
foster growing negative public perceptions of the United 
States and its policies.  The increasing amounts of forward 
deployed military personnel may even have been counter-
productive to U.S. foreign policy.  It certainly appears to 
have been detrimental to the manner in which the United 
States and its policy is perceived.  The data indicates 
that the larger the U.S. military presence is in a 
particular country, the less favorable the United States is 
perceived.  Given this data, the United States should 
reassess whether its growing footprint in the Middle East 
is necessary for the protection of its national interests, 
or whether that footprint in itself is causing greater 
problems. 
It is in this environment that the United States needs 
to carefully consider its next move.  The on-going “War 





continued existence of the United States military presence 
in the Persian Gulf and will continue to do so for the 
foreseeable future.  However, once the issue of Saddam’s 
future in Iraq is decided, the United States should force 
the security of the region back upon the Arab nations 
themselves.   
Arguably, the least successful component of the U.S. 
security strategy over the last decade has been ensuring 
the ability of the Persian Gulf States to defend 
themselves.  Despite billions of dollars of equipment sold 
in the region, the states remain incapable of self-defense 
and continued to look toward the United States to provide 
for their security.  The United States should adopt a 
“train the trainer” mentality and make the GCC countries 
responsible for providing for their own collective 
security.  Strengthening local self-defense capabilities; 
promoting GCC and inter-Arab defense cooperation; and 
enhancing the ability of Western forces to return and fight 
effectively alongside local forces in a crisis was and 
remains a credible three-tier approach behind the creation 
of the GCC security system.98   
This approach reduces the necessity of maintaining a 
large and visible U.S. military presence in the region.  
The United States, if it must play a role in the protection 
of the region, should do so from a distance.  The United 
States should pull the troops out of Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait and return to the “over the horizon” security 
posture that characterized the U.S. presence into the 
1980’s.  The United States should also return to a policy 
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of strict deterrence vice dual containment in the Middle 
East.  The U.S. is more than capable of enforcing a policy 
of deterrence.  With the physical infrastructure that is 
already in place, a quick response to aggressive action in 
doable.  It also takes far less personnel to deter, than 
contain. 
The United States is faced with the fact that the 
Arabs are quite sensitive to the visibility of the United 
States in the Persian Gulf.  The majority of the Arab 
population views American policy as anti-Arab and anti-
Muslim, and are fundamentally opposed to the American 
military presence.   
Looking at the data results from Kuwait, it is easy to 
see that the popularity the United States enjoyed 
immediately after it secured the liberation of Kuwait from 
Iraq during Desert Storm has spiraled downward.  As the 
United States has insisted upon maintaining a greater 
number of U.S. military personnel in Kuwait over the last 
decade, the minds and memories of the Kuwaiti nationals 
seem to have forgotten about the predicament that brought 
the United States to them in the first place.  As shown in 
the polling data, the forgetfulness seems to have begotten 
resentment against the continued policies of the United 
States. 
This result could quite possible be duplicated in 
Central Asia where the United States has already ousted the 
Taliban and continues to pursue its War on Terror.  If the 
United States does not pull its forces out of Afghanistan, 
it is quite likely that we will see the same opposition to 
American policies there as we now see in Kuwait.  Indeed, 





provided a forward deployed military presence for much 
longer than in the Middle East, there seems to be a growing 
insistence that the United States should consider drawing 
down its forces.  If South Korea were to reconcile with 
North Korea, that day would come much sooner than later on 
the Korean Peninsula. 
This thesis is not suggesting a complete withdrawal of 
the United States from the foreign affairs of its allies, 
rather the interests of the United States would seem to be 
served the best if it stayed at arms length from the Middle 
East, possibly an “over the horizon” posture, while 
focusing on the support of key infrastructure that has 
streamlined the U.S. ability to return on short notice if 
necessary. 
The United States is facing stiff foreign resolve 
against its stance and relationship toward and with Israel.  
Allies are distancing themselves, foreign populations are 
resentful, and foreign leaders are placed in precarious 
positions vis-à-vis their domestic populations.   The 
actions of Crown Prince Abdullah demonstrate the reality 
that Arab public opinion is a factor in Arab rulers’ 
decisions.  The Israeli/Palestinian conflict has taken the 
wind out of the sails of the U.S. war on terrorism and it 
is currently reshaping the focus of the Bush 
Administration.  The United States, in its pursuit of 
credibility in the Middle East, has found itself in the 
least credible position in recent history. 
The continued suffering of the Iraqi people coupled 
with the failure of the United States to take action on the 
Israeli/Palestinian peace process exacerbates the growing 





community were recently seen on the September 11, 2001, 
attacks against the United States.99 This event, as well as 
previously carried out attacks, such as the bombings of the 
Khobar Towers and the U.S.S. Cole, violently demonstrate 
how deeply held some of the perceptions against the United 
States are.  The United States is putting forth a large 
effort to protect the lives and the property of Americans 
around the globe.  Once the violent majority few are weeded 
out, the U.S. should turn its attention to some of the more 
popular issues for dissent in the region.  
  The United States has a long way to go before the 
Arab world embraces a more positive perception of American 
policies.  The Middle East has a long and distinguished 
history of being taken advantage of by foreign powers, 
which forms part of a history that fuels public 
perceptions.  The United States national interest of 
security of Israel will begin to dictate how the future 
will continue to unfold.  The United States would do well 
to support the establishment of a Palestinian State and 
pledge an unwavering support for its security and continued 
existence alongside of Israel.  Taking these steps might 
start the long process of recovering a positive public 
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